Introduction
The That is why sociologists have argued that "incorporation" would indeed be a better term than "unification" to describe the political and institutional transition process (1) .
But whereas in a radical breakup, as it has since occurred throughout
Central and Eastern Europe, formal institutions can be suddenly altered, redefined, or replaced, the transformation of their social and economic substrata including the social-psychological structures imposed on people by the old institutional order is a much longer and open-ended process. As such, German unification, despite political and institutional unity, is to viewed as an ongoing and in its historical uniqueness largely experimental project, the further progress and eventual outcomes of which are likely to leave their itiarks not only on East Germany, but also on West Germany and the emerging political, economic, and social "new world order" at large.
In the following paragraphs we give a brief description of the first, but decisive stages of the German reunification "project" with a focus on the socio-economic transformations following political and institutional unification. Chapter 2 outlines core aspects of the socioeconomic Situation of East Germany on the eve of monetary, economic, and social union. In chapter 3 we present empirical evidence about the economic and social changes that have occurred in East Germany since mid 1990. In the final chapter 4 we outline the further prospects of the unification process and discuss its implications for union policies.
. Bottom Lines: East Germany on the Eve of Unification
In political and institutional terms the groundwork of social and economic unification was laid with the bilateral signing of the State treaty on the creation of a monetary, economic, and social union of 18
May 1990 which on 1 July 1990 made the West German DM the common currency of both German states, formally declared East Germany to be a free "social market economy" combining private property, free enterprise, competition, and free price setting with an array of social safeguards and Protections, extended West German labor legislation and jurisdiction to East Germany, reestablished the system of autonomous collective bargaining over wages and working conditions between independent unions and employers organizations, and mandated the East German government to set up a multi-tiers social security system including a comprehensive unemployment insurance and "active" labor market policy scheme after the West German model. The treaty also In economic terms the GDR system exhibited the typical traits common to most Eastern centrally administered, closed economies: low prices for everyday consumption commodities were artificially held stable through massive production subsidies; at the same time rising wage incomes created the money illusion o£ steady productivity increases and growing welfare levels, but were not matched by a growing supply of goods;
whereas an open economy, where price fixing is left to the market and buyers have a choice, would have responded with high inflation and massive imports, both of the latter officially did not exist in the GDR:
instead, the Socialist economies were characterized by a Situation of $xcess money supply or "too much money for too few goods". According to time budget data collected shortly before monetary union in June 1990 some 30 percent of all men and close to 50 percent of all women aged 16 or older in the GDR spent at least two hours on Shopping on a normal weekday (6 In social terms, the GDR regime's declared goal until the late 1970s had been to achieve a high degree of social equality based on equal opportunity, a narrowing of persisting class differentials, and an abolition of the traditional distinctions between manual and intellectual labor. Attempts in the early 1980s to increase individual achievement incentives through allowing a higher degree of wage differentiation largely failed due to persisting supply shortages and the inability of the GDR economy to produce a more varied and higher quality portfolio of commodities and services (7) . On the eve of monetary union, the dissolving GDR society still displayed a (compared to West Germany) highly homogenous or "compressed" wage and income structure: according to data from the first wave of the Socio-Economic
Panel Study East (SOEP-East), a representative longitudinal sample survey of some 2,179 East German households (8) , the distribution of both household and per capita income« in the GDR shortly before monetary union showed significantly less dispersion and a higher concentration around the mean than in West Germany, a finding that held true not only for economically active, but also for inactive households as well as for households with and without children (9) .
The relative equality in nominal incomes, however, was contrasted by a more unequal distribution of durables and housing quality, access to which was regulated largely through informal (and frequently politically mediated) networks rather than through the market mechanism: While West (11)). These data reveal not only a high degree of material inequality in basic assets among GDR households, but also a considerably lower overall living Standard compared to most advanced industrialized countries in the West.
In many ways access to material and social amenities in the former GDR was mediated through the predominating sphere of work: more than in all GDR workers (as compared to some 30 percent of West German workers) were still organized as union members on the eve of monetary union (see figure 1 ) .
(figure 1)
Chronic labor shortages and the character of the production sphere as the politically mandated center of social life are also reflected in the extremely high labor force participation of This impressive picture of formal training is contrasted, however, by a substantial underutilization of workforce skills in the actual production process: according to Establishment data, some 21 percent of the GDR workforce were actually employed in unskilled jobs, and one out of three workers reported that they were not working in the occupation for which they originally had received formal training; in fact, even 60 percent of all workers in unskilled jobs were formally trained workers, although only a tiny fraction of them (6%) considered vocational training necessary to do their job. In this respect, too, the GDR system revealed a high degree of horizontal mal-coordination and misallocation beneath its polished political propaganda surface (15).
All in all, East Germany exhibited all traits of a "work society" (Offe) centered around and focussed on the "sphere of production". This has also been deeply engraved and reflected in the social values of East
Germans that mark a strong contrast to modern Western societies:
generally East Germans, across all ager gender, and status groups, were found to attach a very high subject-ive importance to work, income, and From 1989 to 1991 East Germany's total gross domestic product (GDP)
declined by more than a quarter (-26%), while total consumption at the same time increased by more than 13 percent (private consumption: 16%; public consumption: 7.3%).
In 1991 net imports to East Germany (including "imports" from West Germany minus exports) amounted to almost three quarters (72%) of her total GDP. An extreme example is provided by the automobile industry: whereas in 1990 West German auto manufacturers sold some 700,000 to 800,000 new cars to East Germans, East German automobile sales dropped to almost zero forcing most establishments to end their uncompetitive product lines and to cease their Operations. Not only in the autombile industry, the rapid dismantling of uncompetitive industries in the East has so.far primarily benefitted production in the West.
Whereas the destruction of East Germany's "old" industrial structures has been proceeding rapidly, the reconstruction process has been dragging. In April 1991 social security contributions, shared by halves by employers and employees, were increased by 1.5 percentage points (as of gross wages), a special temporary "unity surcharge" of 7.5 percent was added to the wage, income, and corporate tax, and mineral oil, gasoline, as well as automobile taxes were substantially increased. The gap between gross and net wages widened from (on average) 30.5% to 32.5%. These increases in tax burdens were not matched by wage increases: on average the real net wages per employee declined by 0. had participated in some kind of job-related further training (32).
Last, but not least, the massive use of short-time working subsidies {"Kurzarbeitsrgeld") involving benefifcs m between 68% and 100% of lost wages, has contributed to keeping some 2 million persons in employment, a large part of whom otherwise would have lost their jobs:
until March 1991 the number of workers on subsidized short-time schedules had reached its peak of 2.1 million (or 28% of all workers still employed) whose actual working time on average was 44 percent of their regulär work time and many of whom (some 650,000) were actually on zero work hour schedules (see table 1 ).
(table 1)
The cumulative exonerating effect of these measures on the East German labor market has been estimated to amount to some 1.5 million persons (see table 2 ) .
(table 2)
The overall impact of these dramatic changes on people's previously highly stable and secure lives can be seen from a longltudinal perspective (see table 3 
3)
For those workers who were able to keep their job or managed to find employment elsewhere, the transition process frequently involved major changes in their employment arxd working conditions: -one out of five of these workers had to change to a different occupation than the one worked in on the eve of union; this proportion was larger than average among higher skilled workers, whereas for low- At the bottom of the evolving "new hierarchy" we find the swelling ranks of the unemployed, among whom female workers (who were disproportionately employed in industries severely hit by unification), low-skilled, as well as older workers are claerly overrepresented. For these workers unemployment increasingly becomes a long-term experience without high chances of securing a new job in the newly created or restructured enterprises: of all 550,000 East German unemployed as of November 1990, close to ,six out of ten (58%) were still unemployed eight months later (July 1991), and only one out of four had been able to find a new job. In July 1991, 29 percent of the xneanwhile one million registered unemployed had been without work for more than eight months.
In their search for new jobs the unemployed face the coirqpetition by another 1.2 million employed job seekers, bringing the total number of East Germans on job search to 2.3 million in July 1991 (38).
(table 4)
These results show that it is primarily the labor market through which the "old" social structures are being transformed, opportunities are redistributed, and new social dividing lines evolve to replace the more subtle, though by no means less severe, inequalities that characterized GDR society. According to survey data collected in March 1991, some two million East German workers (or 25.5% of the total employed work force) were expecting to lose their job in the near future (44) . Germany is less than one quarter (24-7%) of that generated by a West
German full-time worker (47). To bring East Germany's economy up to
Western Standards, private investments in the order of some 600 to 700 bn DM and a further 300 bn DM in public investments (in transportation, telecommunications, and public infrastructure) have been estimated to be necessary (48) . How long this will take is illustrated by the fact that currently private investments in East Germany ränge in the order of some 35 to 50 bn DM p.a., and public direct investments in 1992 will amount to 18 bn. DM *.
Against this background the unions' determination to raise East German wages to West German levels by 1994, which would require annual real wage increases of at least 20 percent**, is in need of reconsideration, * According to recent estimates the process of adjustment of East German living Standards and conditions to West German levels may in fact take as long as 12 to 20 years (49). ** Taking into consideration the longer work hours and lower levels of benefits of East Germans, equal wages would still imply total East if persisting mass unemployment is to be prevented: only with a capital stock that matches that in West Germany can wages be raiaed to Western levels without rendering more East German firms uncompetitive, inducing further job losses, and preventing necessary investments for economic reconstruction . By causing further job losses and slowing down new job creation, the unions' high-wage policies, though justifiable in social equity terms, also fail to stem emigration to the West: several recent studies have found that it is unemployment or the threat of job loss rather than perceived East/West wage differentials that increase East Germans' willingness to consider moving to the West (50) .
As most private Investment in the East German economy will come from (19a) According to data supplied by the Institute for Labor Market Research (IAB) at the Federal Employment Agency in Nuremberg, the total number of seif employed East Germans on the eve of economic union did not exceed 185, 000 or 2.2 percent of total employment in East Germany (1989), reflecting the systematic suppression of private business by the former GDR regime. In June 1990, some 8 percent of all East German workers were planning to set up their own business in the following years. The months following unification in fact witnessed a substantial increase in self-employed activities, raising the number of selfemployed to a total of some 400, 000 or 5 percent of the employed labor force: see M. Lechner 
